Much and other types of contractual market exchanges that

Much of the work related to
‘relational contracts’ was based on the studies of Ian Macneil where he claims
there is a separate ‘relational’ category of contracts (Campbell,2004). What he
refers to as “relational” form of contracting, involves arbitration, collective
bargaining and other types of contractual market exchanges that are becoming
more important and need to be recognized (Williamson, 1981). Macneil presents nothing
less than a “holistic” “social
theory” of human exchange-with particular emphasis on the human activity of
“projecting exchange into the future,”
which he calls “contract.”. He develops an elaborate descriptive set of
“norms” that should be undertaken, to if contractual exchange to be exist and
success. Most importantly, however, the convention theory of contract is an unabashed
relational theory of contract (Barnet,1992). According to Barnett’s
(1992) original presentation of a consent theory: “Any concept of
individual rights must assume a social context” and he proposed that certain
rights are important, to enable the existence of a relational order of actions
that allow persons to solve the various problems of knowledge and interest. And
accorded with the second feature of Macneil’s theory that merits investigation is
his consistent assertion that standing behind all relational exchange or
contracts is a socially enforced system of property (Barnet,1992). In
relational exchange, the relationship is a critical governance mechanism and, a
key determinant that lead a relational exchange to the success. Simply where
relational contracts are highly effective, requires a relationship that has
high levels of such relational attributes as trust and commitment that help
govern the exchange (Anderson and Narus 1984, 1990; Day
1995; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Heide and John 1992; Morgan and Hunt 1994;
Wilson 1995), where all those attributes are a created, developed and
exhumed through a social context or based on the social capital theory